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Reﬁ ning the “Modera" on Thesis” Regarding “Radical Par" es”
The Jana Sangh and the BJP between Hindu Na" onalism and Coali" on Poli" cs in India1
Summary
The inclusion of Hindu na" onalist par" es in India’s democra" c process has not resulted in their modera" on in 
a linear way. Since 1947, the par" es have oscillated between a sectarian strategy of religious mobiliza" on and 
a more moderate one respec" ng the secular norms of the Cons" tu" on. Whether the Hindu na" onalist par" es 
opted for the path of radicaliza" on or that of modera" on has chieﬂ y depended on their rela" on with their 
mother organiza" on, the RSS, the percep" on of the Muslims that prevails at a given " me in India, of the a$  tude 
of the other par" es regarding secularism and – in correla" on with the variables men" oned above – of the most 
eﬀ ec" ve electoral tac" c.
Résumé
L’intégra" on des par" s na" onalistes hindous dans le processus démocra" que ne les a pas amenés à davantage 
de modéra" on de façon linéaire. Depuis 1947, ces par" s ont oscillé entre une stratégie sectaire de mobilisa" on 
religieuse et une autre, plus modérée impliquant le respect des normes sécularistes de la Cons" tu" on. Le choix 
de l’une ou l’autre de ces stratégies a dépendu jusqu’à présent de la rela" on du par"  vis-à-vis de l’organisa" on 
dont il procède, le RSS, de la percep" on dominante des Musulmans à un moment donné, de l’a$  tude des autres 
par" s vis-à-vis du sécularisme et – en liaison avec ces variables – de la meilleure tac" que électorale. 
1. This text draws from a paper presented at the APSA Conference of Washington in September 2010. The author is most 
grateful to Mirjam Künkler, the panel organizer, for her comments on an earlier dra& .
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I*+,(-./+0(*
The literature suppor" ng the modera" on theory argues that inclusive regimes which incorporate 
radical par" es in electoral games usually transform these par" es into more moderate poli" cal actors. 
This modera" on process may result from three factors that are likely to make cumula" ve impacts. First, 
when an extremist party contests elec" ons in a democra" c framework, it accepts ins" tu" ons that are 
based on liberal principles, including the rule of law. For instance, the extremist party is qua par" cipa" on 
bound to commit itself to poli" cal diversity (Schwedler 2006). Second, when a radical party contests 
elec" ons, it is bound to dilute its ideology to a  ract voters outside of its core cons" tuency. Michels 
and Schumpeter were the ﬁ rst party theore" cians to assume that extremist par" es had to downplay 
their exclusivism once they enter the electoral arena (Michels [1915] 1962:333-341; Schumpeter 
[1950] 1975:283). Third, when radical par" es are power-driven and aspire to govern, those who fail 
to win an absolute majority are likely to rely on alliances with par" es that do not share its extremism. 
Fourth, while extremist par" es emerge in most cases from ideological movements displaying a 
deep sense of doctrinal purity, they gradually emancipate themselves from them in the process of 
transforming from niche into mass par" es (Clark 2006).
The literature on the inclusion-modera" on theory mostly deals with former extreme le&  par" es 
adjus" ng to the fall of communist regimes in the context of the democra" za" on of European countries 
or with European religious par" es such as the Catholic democrats (Kalyvas 1996, 2000). Here, I shall 
test the theory in the context of the Indian poli" cal system, which represents another ins" tu" onalized 
form of democracy, looking back today at 60 years of democra" c poli" cs. 
Hindu na" onalist par" es were part of the Indian poli" cal system even before independence when 
the Bri" sh introduced reforms allowing some electoral compe" " on in the ﬁ rst decades of the 20th 
century. The na" onalist par" es believed in democracy even then (Mitra and Mitra 1938:420), largely 
because, considering that this regime relies on majority rule and that Hindus form a majority in India, 
they expected that democracy should result, eventually, in the conquest of power by Hindus. But the 
par" es’ integra" on into the Indian democra" c process did not result in their linear modera" on. In 
fact, these par" es have oscillated between a path of radicaliza" on and one of modera" on. When they 
followed the former, elec" ons were a factor of radicaliza" on as the par" es’ mobiliza" on strategy has 
aimed to polarize the electorate along religious lines. When the par" es opted for modera" on, it was 
to lead larger coali" ons and rule the country. This dimension of the modera" on thesis –  the impact 
of the compulsions of coali" on poli" cs – has impacted the Hindu na" onalist par" es only when they 
have needed the support of other par" es. Whether the Hindu na" onalist par" es opted for the path 
of radicaliza" on or that of modera" on has been a func" on of three variables: their rela" on with their 
mother organiza" on, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS – Na" onal Volunteers Corps); their 
percep" on of Muslims and the correla" ve self-percep" on of the Hindus that prevail at any given " me; 
and the strategies of the other poli" cal par" es, be they in oﬃ  ce or in the opposi" on.
I. T2' J$*$ S$*32 T,$4'/+(,5: F,(6 $ R$-0/$& N0/2' P$,+5 +( $* 
U*/(67,(6080*3 C($&0+0(* P$,+*', (1951-1977)
In 1951, the Jana Sangh emerged from a Hindu na" onalist movement which was much older. Hindu 
na" onalism, as an ideology, crystallized in the 1920s when Hindu leaders of diﬀ erent backgrounds, 
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including revolu" onaries and members of the Congress party, reacted similarly to the perceived threat of 
the Muslim minority (about 20% of the popula" on of the Bri" sh Raj). The turning point was the Khilafat 
movement that Indian Muslims organized in order to protest against the aboli" on of the Caliphate 
in Istanbul in 1924 that had been decided by the victors of World War I, including Britain. In India, 
demonstra" ons aimed at the Bri" sh hit the Hindus, an easier target, and resulted in an unprecedented 
wave of riots in 1921-1927 (Minault 1982). Some Hindu leaders then relaunched a rather dormant wing 
of the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha, which became a radical Hindu na" onalist party independent 
from the Congress in 1937. Others created Hindu defense movements, called “mili" as” by the Bri" sh. 
Among them, the best organized one was the RSS which drew its ideology from the no" on of Hindutva, 
or Hindu-ness, invented in 1923 by a revolu" onary turned an" -Muslim, V. D. Savarkar. 
Savarkar argues that the Indian na" onal iden" ty is embodied in Hindu culture, which encompasses 
not only Hinduism as a religion, but also a language, Sanskrit (and its main vernacular deriva" ve, 
Hindi), the worship of Hindustan as a sacred land and the cult of the Vedic Golden Age. The importance 
of non-religious elements, such as language, suggests that the Hindu na" onalist movement was an 
ethno-religious movement right from the beginning. In line with his mo  o “Hindu, Hindi, Hindusthan!,” 
Savarkar demanded that the religious minori" es pay allegiance to the dominant Hindu iden" ty and 
limit the manifesta" ons of their faith to the private sphere (Savarkar [1923] 1969). Indeed, the RSS 
refused non-Hindu members, even though it claimed to represent all the Indians.
I.1. The RSS, A Sectarian and Authoritarian Hindu Na" onalist Matrix
In contrast to most other na" onalist movements, including fascist ones, the RSS did not iden" fy 
with one leader2 and did not regard the conquest of state power as a priority. In fact, the movement 
preferred to remain aloof from the poli" cal arena. For its ﬁ rst supreme leader (Sarsanghchalak), K. B. 
Hedgewar (1925-1940), and his successor M. S. Golwalkar (1940-1973), the priority task was to reform 
Hindu society from below – not from above through the state apparatus. They both looked at Hindus as 
weak and vulnerable vis-à-vis the Muslims, who were well-represented in commerce, the military, the 
academy and the administra" on. The two were also apprehensive of the new militancy of the lower 
castes and feared the growing appeal of Gandhi’s brand of Hinduism that emphasized non-violence. By 
contrast, the RSS aspired to restore a mar" al brand of Hinduism and to reshape the mind and the body 
of the Hindus in order to make them warrior-like.
For decades, the main aim of the RSS was to expand the network of its branches where this 
training was imparted to (mostly young) Hindus. Hedgewar decided to train a special body of RSS 
cadres to this eﬀ ect, the so-called pracharaks. The members of this avant-garde were supposed to 
dedicate their whole life to the RSS. Even though they were o& en well-educated, they gave up the idea 
of embracing a professional career. They did not marry either. Instead, the RSS became their family, a 
sort of “brotherhood in saﬀ ron” – the sacred color of Hinduism and that of the RSS ﬂ ag – as suggested 
by Walter Andersen and Shriddhar Damle (Andersen and Damle 1987). In 2004, the RSS had 33,758 
branches all over India (The Hindu, 13 March 2004) and probably two to three million members. 
2. Six leaders have successively occupied the post of supreme leader of the RSS: K. B. Hedgewar (1925-1940), M. S. Golwalkar 
(1940-1973), Babasaheb Deoras (1973-1994), Rajendra Singh (1994-2000) and K. S. Sudarshan (2000-2009) and Mohan 
Bhagwat (2009-).
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Ideologically, the RSS is not democra" c . Its ideology is based on a xenophobic brand of ethnic 
na" onalism. In its view, non-Hindus can only be second class-ci" zens. If they do not give up their 
religious iden" ty in the public sphere, they may even be looked at as ﬁ & h columnists of Pakistan 
(when they are Muslims) or the Pope (when they are Catholics). Second, the RSS does not organize 
internal elec" ons. The organiza" on has a quasi representa" ve body, the Akhil Bhara  ya Pra  nidhi 
Sabha (Delegate Assembly of All India), which designates the organiza" on’s General Secretary. But 
there is never more than one candidate per post. Moreover, the Delegate Assembly is not in charge of 
appoin" ng the more important post of the supreme leader. Most of the organiza" on’s supreme leaders 
have been designated by their predecessor and/or by a very small clique of RSS leaders. Last but not 
least, the RSS cul" vates a secre" ve modus operandi and forbids its members from taking part in public 
debates.
Among the ﬁ rst components of the “Sangh family” (or Sangh parivar in Hindi) to be launched by 
the RSS were a student union in 1948, a labor union in 1955, and between the two, a poli" cal party in 
1951, the Bhara" ya Jana Sangh (Indian People’s Alliance – BJS) (Jaﬀ relot 2006a). Indeed, RSS leaders 
sought to create front organiza" ons to reach out to domains in which they were not ac" ve. The RSS 
did not create its party alone, but cofounded it with Shyam Prasad Mookerjee, the former president 
of the Hindu Mahasabha. Mookerjee was more than happy to receive the support of the Sangh family 
for launching a more dynamic poli" cal organiza" on. The Jana Sangh – as it came to be popularly called 
– was established just before the ﬁ rst general elec" on in 1951. Mookerjee died in 1953 and the RSS 
leaders who had been seconded to the party apparatus immediately took over and marginalized the 
old lieutenants of Mookerjee. 
I.2. The Jana Sangh’s Sectarianism (1951-1967): Rejec" on of Diversity and Radical 
Mobiliza" ons
The Jana Sangh replicated the RSS structure under the aegis of its supreme leader M. S. Golwalkar, 
who had agreed to the crea" on of the party only reluctantly (The Organizer, 25 June 1956:5) and who 
was keen not to let it acquire any signiﬁ cant autonomy. Most of the party cadres came from the RSS, 
including Deendayal Upadhyaya, who func" oned as the party’s General Secretary un" l his mysterious 
death in 1968 (Jaﬀ relot 1996:89). RSS cadres also occupied the posi" ons of Organizing Secretaries who 
formed the party’s steel frame. The party-building pa  ern that crystallized under Upadhyaya therefore 
enabled the RSS to exert a strong inﬂ uence over the Jana Sangh because of the rela" onship between 
the party cadres and their mother organiza" on. As a result, the party tended to replicate the taste 
for ideological discourses and secrecy of its mother organiza" on. Its leaders were eager to retain the 
ideological purity of the RSS and its upper caste, even brahminical, ethos. Therefore, the a  rac" veness 
of the Jana Sangh as a poli" cal party was limited to tradi" onal elites of North India since the southern 
provinces could not accept languages deriving from Sanskrit, including Hindi, as their idiom. The Jana 
Sangh remained a niche party for that reason and contended itself with that status for ten years. 
In fact, it was as much a niche party in the sense of Adams, Clark, Ezrow and Glasgow (2006) as a 
“message seeker” (Greene 2007) less interested in winning elec" ons than in using electoral pla= orms 
to propagate its ideology.
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Table 1: Performance of the Jana Sangh in Na" onal Elec" ons
(seats won and % of valid votes)
Year 1952 1957 1962 1967 1971
Seats
(%)
3
(3.1)
4
(5.9)
14
(6.4)
35
(9.4)
22
(7.4)
But the party was supposed to speak for all the Hindus and to inﬂ uence the state. It was even 
supposed to capture power in order to correct the public policies which the ruling party, the Congress, 
had designed and which, according to the followers of Hindutva were detrimental to the Hindus. Among 
these were the recogni" on of English and regional languages at the expense of Hindi, the correla" ve 
crea" on of linguis" c states in the framework of a federal union, ins" tu" ons that the Hindu na" onalists 
wanted to abolish because of “their dangerous poten" al for secession” (The Organizer, 24 January, 
1956:5); the gran" ng of an autonomous status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir that Nehru had 
promoted to defuse the separa" st tendencies in the province (something that in the eyes of the Hindu 
na" onalists weakened na" onal unity)3; the con" nua" on of the Shariat as personal law of the Muslims 
whereas the Hindu personal law was reformed according to western principles; the freedom to convert 
to another religion; and last but not least, the possibility of slaughtering cows. 
Cows are sacred animals in Hinduism and many Hindu leaders – including tradi" onalist congressmen 
– were in favor of a ban on cow slaughter, something the secular Indians (congressmen and le& ist) and 
the minori" es, especially the Muslims, regarded as objec" onable since they were meat eaters. The Jana 
Sangh decided to instrumentalize this symbol of iden" ty in order to mobilize the majority community 
at the " me of elec" ons. A case in point was the 1967 elec" on campaign.4 The party joined hands with 
another front organiza" on of the RSS, the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP – World Hindu Associa" on) which 
was intended to federate all the Hindu sects and to gather their representa" ves on the same pla= orm. 
Some of the most prominent religious ﬁ gures went on fast for weeks, and in the street the Jana Sangh, 
with the support of the RSS, made unprecedented eﬀ orts to mobilize its supporters. In February 1967, 
hundreds of thousands of demonstrators rallied around the Parliament of India and assaulted this 
temple of Indian democracy in order to force the MPs to pass a law prohibi" ng cow slaughter. No mass 
movement had been so popular since independence in 1947. As the ac" vists were determined to 
storm the Parliament, the police intervened and killed eight of them, who in turn became the martyrs 
of this cause.
The Jana Sangh made some progress during the general elec" ons immediately therea& er, jumping 
from 6.4 to 9.4% of the valid votes (see Table 1). But the cow protec" on movement failed to make a 
major impact for three reasons. First, Hindus were not as responsive as the Jana Sangh party expected, 
because cow slaughter was not an existen" al issue and many states of the Indian Union had already 
passed prohibi" ve laws in that respect. Second, the government did not compromise with secularism. 
While India admi  ed religious par" es, its Cons" tu" on commi  ed the country to secularism, thereby 
prohibi" ng the use of religion in the poli" cal sphere. Prime Minister Nehru observed strict secular norms 
and fought the Hindu na" onalists as his archenemies. He was very well aware of the Hindu na" onalists’ 
3. The importance of the Kashmir issue for the Jana Sangh was evident from the personal involvement of its ﬁ rst president, 
S. P. Mookerjee, who took part in the Kashmir Andolan (Agita" on) in 1953 and died in jail in Jammu and Kashmir (probably of 
heart a  ack) a& er he had been arrested for taking part in this movement.
4. For a detailed account on this episode of the Jana Sangh’s career see Jaﬀ relot (1996:204-209).
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a  empts to instrumentalize religion during elec" on campaigns. In 1956, he ordered the imprisonment 
of ac" vists who had reprinted a book " tled Living Biographies of Religious Leaders of the World, whose 
provoca" ve depic" on of the Prophet Mohammad had resulted in violent Hindu/Muslim tensions in 
North India (Nehru 1985:436). Nehru was convinced that the riots had been masterminded by Hindu 
na" onalist par" es “to a  racts votes in the forthcoming elec" ons” (Gupta 1965:250) by polarizing the 
voters along religious lines. In 1959, RSS leader Golwalkar was sentenced to a ﬁ ne of 500 rupees and 
six months’ imprisonment for a speech encouraging communal hatred. He was eventually acqui  ed 
on appeal (The Organizer, 16 November, 1961:7), but the trial signaled that Hindu na" onalist leaders 
could not ar" culate their most extreme views in public as long as Nehru was watching them. Press 
reports of that " me suggest that, as a result of the state’s vigilance, the Hindu na" onalists abstained 
from instrumentalizing religion openly: in “Lucknow [the capital city of U  ar Pradesh], the Jana Sangh 
is shy of parading itself as a Hindu party […] the house to house propaganda is diﬀ erent from pla= orm 
speeches” (Na  onal Herald, 8 January, 1962:1). Harold Gould’s study of the 1962 elec" on campaign 
in Faizabad (U  ar Pradesh) conﬁ rms this disjunc" on between the public and the private discourses of 
the Hindu na" onalists: “Privately, the Jana Sangh spokesmen were in" ma" ng to all who should listen 
that all Muslims would be sent to Pakistan following a Jana Sangh victory at the polls” (Gould 1966:67). 
In 1965, even a& er Nehru’s death, RSS dignitaries considered that “direct par" cipa" on in communal 
riots would result in a ban,” as it did in 1948-1949, the darkest years of the RSS (Johnson 1970:83). 
Undoubtedly, Nehru’s commitment to secularism contained the most extreme use of religion by Hindu 
na" onalists in India’s poli" cal arena.
Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, maintained the same line of conduct as her father. In 1967, she 
did not bow to any of the Hindu na" onalists’ demands regarding cow slaughter and she jus" ﬁ ed 
con" nued police repression. She let one of the religious leaders die while on hunger strike; she refused 
to nego" ate any interim ban on cow slaughter – a sugges" on of some Jana Sangh leaders in order to 
break the stalemate – and she ﬁ red the Home Minister who had failed to contain the demonstra" ons, 
allegedly because he somewhat sympathized with them. 
I.3. The Jana Sanghis’ Incomplete Modera" on (1968-1979)
The rela" ve failure of the 1967 cow protec" on movement coincided with the change of strategy 
of Jana Sangh, whose leaders had realized that a radical approach would conﬁ ned the Jana Sangh to 
the same marginal role as the Hindu Mahasabha. The party tried to become acceptable to new voters 
in order to enlarge its electoral base in social and geographical terms. The most signiﬁ cant move in 
this direc" on was the way it watered down its Hindi-only policy in order to a  ract more supporters 
from South India. This change was consummated in December 1967, during its Calicut (Kerala) plenary 
session – the ﬁ rst in South India –, when the party declined to set a deadline for making Hindi the 
na" onal language and admi  ed that the adop" on of this idiom had to take place on a voluntary 
basis.5 Simultaneously, the Jana Sangh developed a new interest in socio-economic issues in a rather 
populist vein in order to speak to “the common man” – a formula party president A. B. Vajpayee used 
systema" cally.
The Jana Sangh’s modera" on was also partly due to the changing strategy of other opposi" on 
par" es that were prepared to partner with it. Un" l the 1960s, the Jana Sangh was persona non grata 
(or “the poli" cal untouchable” as its leaders used to say) to most opposi" on par" es, including the 
5. For a synthe" c view of the Jana Sangh’s resolu" ons regarding the language issue, see chapter 12 of Jaﬀ relot (2007).
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socialist groupings, which strongly cri" cized its communalism. In the early 1960s, the socialist leader, 
R .M. Lohia developed the no" on of non-congressism, which advocated the need, for the opposi" on 
par" es, to join hands against the Congress. In 1967, this rapprochement resulted in the making of 
post-elec" on coali" ons in some states where the Jana Sangh became part of the governments. None 
of them lasted for long because of ideological diﬀ erences which some" mes reﬂ ected the contras" ng 
social basis of the allied par" es. For instance, the Jana Sangh was very reluctant vis-à-vis the recogni" on 
of Urdu as an oﬃ  cial language in Bihar and U  ar Pradesh and vis-à-vis any land reform – two things the 
socialists and the communists who were part of the government of these states were keen to promote. 
By the late 1960s, the Congress was back in almost all the states but this episode of coali" on poli" cs 
had shown to the Jana Sangh leaders that they could be acceptable to other opposi" on par" es even 
a& er a sectarian elec" on campaign.
Before the 1971 elec" ons, the opponents to the Congress (including the Congress (O), a breakaway 
fac" on which had fought against Indira Gandhi’s new socialist agenda) formed a Grand Alliance. It did not 
make any impact because Indira Gandhi had become remarkably popular. But the Jana Sangh became 
even more familiar with coali" on poli" cs in this framework. It played a key role in the JP Movement, a 
movement named a& er Jaya Prakash Narayan, a Gandhian veteran who led the opposi" on’s campaign 
against Prime Minister Gandhi’s authoritarianism and the corrup" on of the poli" cal class. The Prime 
Minister reacted to this movement by declaring the state of emergency. Most of the opposi" on leaders, 
except the communists, were jailed.
In jail, all the leaders of the opposi" on par" es, including the Jana Sangh, the Socialist Party and the 
Congress (O) joined hands. Immediately a& er Indira Gandhi announced elec" ons in 1977, they merged 
into a new party once out of jail. The new party, the Janata Party, won an overwhelming majority in 
March 1977. The Hindu na" onalists had made themselves fully acceptable to their partners, especially 
to conserva" ve leaders of the Congress (O) like Morarji Desai, the new Prime Minister, and those of the 
Lok Dal, a party of the dominant peasantry, including its leader, Charan Singh, the Vice Prime Minister 
in 1977. President of the former Jana Sangh A. B. Vajpayee became Minister of Foreign Aﬀ airs and L. K. 
Advani became Minister of Informa" on and Broadcas" ng. 
The RSS had favored the merger of the Jana Sangh in the Janata Party because its priority was to 
dislodge Indira Gandhi from power. Mrs. Gandhi had become the bête noire of the RSS the moment she 
had decided to ban the organiza" on – along with many others –, calling to the mind of its leaders the 
dark years of 1948-1949. During the Emergency, new RSS supreme leader Balasaheb Deoras wrote to 
Mrs. Gandhi, pleading – in a not very digniﬁ ed way – for the li& ing of the ban in exchange of his pu$  ng 
the RSS at the service of the development work undertaken by the government (Du   1978:138-148). 
A& er Mrs. Gandhi ignored this plea, the RSS set out to ﬁ ght the Emergency. The RSS was also in favor of 
the Janata Party because its rise to power resulted in the forma" on of a more friendly government and 
the appointment of Hindu na" onalist ministers. This development allowed the RSS and its subsidiaries 
to expand their ac" vi" es, including an" -Muslim provoca" ons which resulted in an unprecedented 
number of communal riots.6
Indeed, coali" on poli" cs, once again, did not translate into any signiﬁ cant ideological and behavioral 
changes. The ex-Jana Sanghis had not given up their core doctrine, as evident from the three measures 
they promoted within the Janata Party government. First, they introduced in parliament a bill aiming 
6. The number of Hindu-Muslim riots rose from 169 in 1976 to 188 in 1977, 230 in 1978 and 304 in 1979 (Jaﬀ relot 1996:301). 
Among them, the riots of Aligarh (1978) and Jamshedpur (1979) were inves" gated by independent commissions which 
concluded that Hindu na" onalist ac" vists had been involved (see First Annual Report of the Minori  es Commission (1973), 
New Delhi, Government of India Press, p. 73, and Report of the three-member Commission of Inquiry Headed by Shri Jitendra 
Narain former Judge of Patna High Court (1981), New Delhi, p. 40).
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to ban cow slaughter. Second, they argued that the history textbooks should be rewri  en in such a 
way that the Muslim invasions be described as truly savage. Further, references to the no" on of “Aryan 
invasions” should be removed, since, for them, Hindus were the sons of the soil whereas the minori" es 
were latecomers in India (Rudolph 1984). Third, they advocated the passing of a law against “forced 
conversion” and the wording of the bill they introduced was likely to infringe upon freedom of religion. 
The Socialists objected to these three measures, arguing that these were ar" cles of faith of the RSS, 
not of the Janata Party. As a consequence, a “dual membership” controversy unfolded during which 
the ex-Jana Sanghis were described by the Socialists – and the Congress – as pretending to be part 
and parcel of the Janata Party when, in fact, they were s" ll paying allegiance to the RSS. An" cipa" ng 
that the sectarian a$  tude of the RSS would be a problem for the Janata Party, the party asked the 
RSS to open itself to “followers of other religions, especially of those religions which were not born in 
Bharat [meaning the Indian homeland] such as Islam and Chris" anity, but are Bhara" ya [belong to the 
homeland] in the same way as Hindus are” (Narayan 1979:1). But the RSS ignored this invita" on and 
when the ex-Jana Sanghis were compelled to choose between severing their links with the RSS or to 
leave the Janata Party, they opted for the la  er. 
The career of the Jana Sangh suggests that the modera" on thesis may need to be amended in 
the case of Hindu na" onalism. Certainly, the party diluted some aspects of its ini" al program, such as 
the promo" on of Hindi as a common language that could alienate the South Indian voters. In the late 
1960s, these developments – including the recruitment of local notables and the socializa" on of the 
party-leaders into the parliamentary system – led students of the party to an" cipate an irreversible shi&  
of the party towards modera" on (Davey 1969:3, 16 and 209; Baxter 1971:315-316). But the democra" c 
game, including elec" ons failed to convert Hindu na" onalists into supporters of the secular spirit of the 
Indian Cons" tu" on. In fact, electoral compe" " on did not contradict the most radical dimension of the 
Jana Sangh’s favorite strategy, the manipula" on of Hindu symbols (such as the sacred cow) in order to 
mobilize supporters in a strident way before the elec" ons. On the contrary, the holding of elec" ons 
made such campaigns more likely. What dissuaded the Jana Sangh to con" nue with such mobiliza" on 
techniques was the non-compromising a$  tude of the Congress governments which defended the 
cons" tu" onal rules. This push factor was complemented by a pull factor since, at the same " me, other 
opposi" on par" es were prepared to join hands with the Jana Sangh, even if it did not give up the 
Hindutva-oriented aspects of its program. As a result of these two facets of the poli" cal system – a 
secular government and an accommoda" ng opposi" on –, the Jana Sangh “mainstreamed” itself in 
the 1970s, not because it became more moderate, but because the center of gravity of Indian poli" cs 
shi& ed to more conserva" ve and even tradi" onalist sectors of the poli" cal spectrum. The leading role 
played by the Congress (O) and Charan Singh in the Janata Party bore tes" mony of this evolu" on. But 
the most important variable in the life of the party, its organic rela" on with the RSS, prevented this 
evolu" on to reach its natural conclusion: the ex-Jana Sanghis were unable or unwilling to sever their 
links with the RSS in the late 1970s. As a result, their modera" on turned out to be rather shallow, as 
evident from the bills they introduced in parliament. 
II. T2' BJP I*Q',+ U C.,Q', $ R'7'$+'- P$++',* – T2' O+2', W$5 A,(.*-
As a result of the “dual membership controversy,” most Jana Sanghis le&  the Janata Party in 1979 
and the party largely disintegrated a year later. The ex-Jana Sanghis then formed a new party called 
Bhara" ya Janata Party (Party of the Indian People). Its trajectory contrasted with its predecessor’s in 
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the sense that it adopted a moderate agenda ﬁ rst, and then became radical – before becoming more 
moderate again, following an invert U curve which went on a par with its elec" on results. Despite this 
varia" on, the factors accoun" ng for the BJP’s changing approach to poli" cs are surprisingly similar to 
those commanding the career of the Jana Sangh. 
II.1. The BJP as a Moderate Party (1980-1989)
A& er the demise of the Janata Party, the BJP leaders were apprehensive of returning to the niche-
status to which the Jana Sangh had been conﬁ ned. Retaining the word “Janata” in its name, the BJP 
aspired to keep some of the aura of the Janata Party, which had embodied a consensus force of the 
opposi" on. BJP president A. B. Vajpayee was keen to abandon most of the Hindutva-based iden" ty of 
the Jana Sangh. He introduced two new ar" cles of faith which did not echo the Hindu na" onalist legacy: 
“Gandhian socialism” and “posi" ve secularism.” The former referred to the Gandhian development 
model, with its strong emphasis on the village as the basic unit of the Indian economy.7 The old social 
basis of the BJP, made of shopkeepers, ar" sans and professionals (small towns lawyers, doctors, etc.) 
was likely to be responsive to the an" -capitalist overtone of this mo  o, but not the new middle class 
emerging from the liberaliza" on measures of Mrs. Gandhi, who was back in oﬃ  ce in 1980. “Posi" ve 
secularism” was an implicit cri" que of the Congress’ “pseudo-secularism” (a phrase coined by the Hindu 
na" onalists to denounce the way the ruling party “pampered” the minori" es to get their votes). But it 
was also an explicit endorsement of the secular nature of the regime, something the core electorate of 
the Jana Sangh and the RSS had never reconciled themselves with.
The moderate discourse of the BJP was intended to make electoral alliances easier. In 1984, the 
BJP formed a Na" onal Democra" c Alliance (NDA) with the party of Charan Singh. But Singh withdrew 
from the NDA just before the December 1984 elec" ons. The BJP leaders therefore made an ad hoc and 
limited electoral pact with what was le&  of the Janata Party. 
The RSS was explicitly displeased by the BJP’s strategy. RSS cadres were not asked to support the 
BJP during the 1984 elec" ons. In fact, in some places like Delhi, they opted for the Congress and his 
new leader, Rajiv Gandhi. But that was an ephemeral tac" cal move. The new RSS strategy was diﬀ erent. 
It consisted in promo" ng a militant use of religious symbols in order to create a Hindu vote bank 
through which the Hindu demographic majority would be turned into a poli" cal majority. RSS supreme 
leader Deoras (who had succeeded Golwalkar in 1973) argued in 1979: 
Hindus must now awaken themselves to such an extent that even from the elec" ons 
point of view the poli" cians will have to respect the Hindu sen" ments and change 
their policy accordingly. […] If others put up demands, they are accepted, but even 
genuine demands by Hindus are ignored. This is because Muslims and other minori" es 
usually vote en bloc while Hindus are divided. Once Hindus get united, the government 
would [need to] start caring for them also. (Hindu Vishva,n°14, 7-8 March 1979:92)
The RSS relied on the VHP, another offshoot of the Sangh Parivar, to achieve this end. In 1984, the 
RSS and the VHP launched a new mobiliza" on campaign which did not focus on the sacred cow, but on 
another powerful Hindu symbol, Lord Ram. They demanded that the temple that once allegedly stood 
7. For a detailed analysis of the social basis of the Jana Sangh, see Graham (1990).
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above the supposed birthplace of the god Ram in Ayodhya, U  ar Pradesh, should be rebuilt. The Hindu 
temple was said to have been replaced by a mosque in the 16th century a& er the (Muslim) Mughal 
dynasty rose to power. This issue was well chosen, given the popularity of Lord Ram among Hindus, 
par" cularly in the north of India. The VHP immediately rallied several religious ﬁ gures whose pres" ge 
further ampliﬁ ed its capacity for mobiliza" on. Together they demanded that the current Babri Mosque 
be replaced by a “rebuilt” Ram temple. The central theme of the agita" on was that Ram, by being 
ﬁ gura" vely “placed” in a mosque, had been reduced to a “prisoner behind bars” since the mosque had 
been sealed in 1949 as a disputed place of worship (Van Der Veer 1987).
At the beginning, the BJP tried to abstain from this agita" on, fearing it would not be in a posi" on to 
make allies if it returned to extremist moves. Eventually, however, the party gave up its moderate line 
of conduct, for reasons that already played a decisive role in the trajectory of the Jana Sangh.
First, the RSS requested the BJP to return to the doctrinal purity of Hindutva poli" cs and warned 
the party that its network of volunteers would not canvass for its candidates if the party remained 
adamantly moderate. Second, the electoral context was conducive to Hindu na" onalist radicaliza" on. 
On the one hand, no signiﬁ cant opposi" on party had accepted to partner with the BJP in spite of its 
modera" on. On the other hand, the ruling Congress had not maintained the impeccable secularism 
of the 1950s-1970s. Rajiv Gandhi, far from following the examples of his mother and grandfather, 
communalized Indian poli" cs. In 1985, he tried to woo the Muslim opinion leaders by reasser" ng the 
role of the Shariat as the Personal law of their community in the Shah Bano aﬀ air,8 and four years later, 
he played the Hindu card by invoking the name of Ram in Faizabad (the headquarter of the district 
where Ayodhya is located) from where he launched his elec" on campaign. The erosion of secularism as 
one of the key norma" ve rules of the Indian polity legi" mized the use of some religious language by the 
Hindu na" onalists. Third, in the 1980s, Hindus felt vulnerable. On the one hand minori" es developed 
militant strategies: Sikh separa" sts a  acked Hindus, Islamists were accused of conver" ng Dalits9 (as in 
Meenakshipuram, Tamil Nadu, in 1981) and by the end of the decade, Kashmir had become the new 
ba  le ground for Jihadists. On the other hand, the Congress government laid itself to the cri" que of 
“pseudo-secularism” by cul" va" ng the Muslim vote bank like in the Shah Bano case, which prepared 
the ground for a Hindu backlash.
II.2. The Radical Phase of the BJP (1989-1998): Elec" ons against Democracy or the Polariza" on 
of the Indian Voters along Religious Lines?
D uring the 1989 elec" on campaign, RSS ac" vists, VHP religious ﬁ gures, and BJP candidates 
canvassed thousands of towns and villages to consecrate bricks stamped with Ram’s name and des" ned 
to be used to “rebuild” the Ram temple in Ayodhya. The bricks were carried in processions imita" ng 
8. Shah Bano had been the spouse, since 1932, of a lawyer from Indore who married for the second " me in 1975 and separated 
from her according to Muslim customary law in 1978. Invoking sec" on Sec" on 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, she 
sued him and as a result established her right to alimony. When, in 1980, she demanded a review of her allowance, her former 
husband appealed to the Supreme Court, pleading that according to Shariat law, he was not obliged to con" nue payments 
to her a& er the iddat (a period of three months a& er the divorce. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on 23 April 1985, 
poin" ng out that Sec" on 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applied to people of all faiths, and that the Quran itself 
required that a divorced wife should be paid an allowance (in Jaﬀ relot 1996:334).
9. Dalit is a self-designa" on for a group of people tradi" onally regarded as of lower class and unsuitable for making personal 
rela" onships. Dalits are a mixed popula" on of numerous caste groups all over South Asia, and speak various languages 
(editors’ note).
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those organized for religious celebra" ons in which idols are carried along a precise i" nerary.10 In several 
places, these processions resulted in riots following an iden" cal scenario in each case: a procession 
in the form of a show of strength (some" mes including over 10,000 people) stretched along several 
kilometers; despite the local authori" es’ recommenda" ons or interdicts, they entered the Muslim 
neighborhoods where they chanted slogans such as “there are only two places for Muslims, Pakistan 
and the cemetery” [Pakistan aur Kabristan]; these provoca" ons prompted the inhabitants to throw 
stones from neighboring homes, to which procession members, who o& en turned out to be well-
armed, retaliated with bloody assaults. In Bhagalpur (Bihar) more than 1,000 people, mostly Muslim, 
died. 
This pre-electoral communal violence was a clear component of the strategy of the BJP which wanted 
to polarize the electorate along religious lines of cleavage and thus deepened the Hindu group iden" ty so 
that its members would end up “vo" ng Hindu,” a scenario Steven Wilkinson observed in U  ar Pradesh 
(Wilkinson 2004). Recourse to so-called religious processions thus proved crucial for mobilizing people. The 
Ayodhya temple campaign contributed to bringing the score of the BJP from two seats (out of 543) in 1984 
up to 85 seats in 1989 in the lower house of Parliament.
Table 2: Performance of the BJP in Na" onal Elec" ons
(seats won and % of valid votes)
1984
BJP
1989
BJP
1991
BJP
1996
BJP
1998
BJP
1999
BJP
2004
BJP
2009
BJP
2
(7.4)
85
(11.4)
119
(20.1)
160
(20.29)
178
(25.59)
182
(23.75)
138
(22.16)
116
(18.84)
Immediately a& er the elec" ons, the BJP became part of a coali" on which comprised many diﬀ erent 
par" es, including the Janata Dal of the new Prime Minister, V. P. Singh. As in 1967, Hindu na" onalists 
combined an ethno-religious radical electoral campaign on the one hand with, on the other, the making 
of a post-electoral coali" on with par" es that did not share its ideology. And like in 1967, they proved 
the modera" on thesis wrong because coali" on poli" cs did not lead them to dilute their ideology. In 
fact, in 1990, the BJP President, L. K. Advani launched a huge movement across India (the “Rath Yatra”), 
in order to mobilize support for building a Ram temple in Ayodhya. In many ci" es, Advani’s mee" ngs 
were responsible for Hindu/Muslim riots. Advani was arrested before reaching Ayodhya, but ac" vists 
stormed the Babri Mosque and dozens of them were killed in police repression. The movement had its 
martyrs, whose ashes were taken all over India in processions that in turn became the root cause for 
a new wave of riots. In midst of the upheaval, the BJP withdrew its support to Singh’s government and 
the la  er fell as a consequence. But when mid-term elec" ons were held the following year (1991), the 
BJP jumped from 85 to 119 seats in the lower house of Parliament.
This radical phase of the BJP culminated in the demoli" on of the Babri Mosque by Hindu na" onalists 
on 6 December 1992. This move was presented as a spontaneous upsurge of Hindu ac" vists by the 
BJP leaders who claimed that they had nothing to do with it. But the inquiry commission – whose 
conclusions were leaked in 2009 – showed that the BJP had contributed to orchestrate the episode. 
The radicaliza" on of the BJP in the late 1980s-early 1990s stemmed from the interplay of our three 
variables. First, the RSS, whose leader had decided to promote the making of a Hindu vote bank through 
10. For a detailed report on a Mahayajna, see, for example, the one on Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh Chronicle, 11 November 
1989:9, and Dainik Bhaskar, 11 November 1989:3.
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the instrumentaliza" on of the Ayodhya issue, remote-controlled the party, whereas the VHP provided 
the party with religious leaders who gave an addi" onal – sacred – legi" macy to the movement. Second, 
the BJP could cash in on a deep sense of Hindu vulnerability fostering a collec" ve backlash. Third, 
the poli" cal context allowed the party to pursue its radical agenda. On the one hand, its coali" on 
partners of 1989 had not seriously objected to its poli" cal use of the Ayodhya issue during the elec" on 
campaign, and the government of V. P. Singh waited un" l the last minute (" ll Advani was about to enter 
U  ar Pradesh) with the arrest of Advani’s Rath Yatra in 1990. On the other hand, the Congress, a& er 
it returned to power in 1991, did not prevent the Hindu na" onalists from a  acking the Babri Mosque 
and the organiza" on that had been responsible for its demoli" on was never indicted. The RSS and the 
VHP (as well as the Bajrang Dal, the youth wing of the la  er) were banned intermi  ently, but only for 
a few months and only on paper. The BJP eventually returned to the path of modera" on in 1996, not 
because of the a$  tude of other par" es, but because it realized that it had to woo poten" al allies to 
form a ruling coali" on a& er it had become the largest Indian party with 160 seats in the 1996 elec" ons. 
II.3. The Rela" ve Modera" on of a Coali" on Leader: The BJP 1998-2004
In 1998, a& er the BJP won a record 178 seats – a performance repeated in 1999 (182 seats) – party 
president Advani embarked on a moderate phase in the career of the BJP, as a learning experience 
from the debacle in 1996, when Prime Minister Vajpayee could not form a coali" on government 
bar poten" al allies: “Though we were the largest party, we failed to form a government. It was felt 
that on an ideological basis we couldn’t go further. So we embarked on the course of alliance-based 
coali" ons…” (Interview of L. K. Advani in Outlook, 25 October 1999:38).
Advani explicitly established a rela" on between the way the BJP had diluted its Hindu na" onalism 
and the making of alliances under its aegis. Both phenomena culminated in 1998 in the forma" on of 
the Na" onal Democra" c Alliance. The BJP and its alliance partners evolved a “Na" onal Agenda for 
Government” in March 1998 and Vajpayee formed his government on this basis (Organiser, Varsha 
Pradipada Special, 29 March 1998:27-30). Mainstays of the Sangh Parivar’s program – the Ram temple 
to be built in Ayodhya, the aboli" on of Ar" cle 370 of the Cons" tu" on gran" ng some autonomy to 
Jammu and Kashmir, and the establishment of a uniform civil code aiming to deprive the religious 
minori" es of one feature of their par" cular juridical iden" ty – were not included in this agenda because 
most BJP allies did not appreciate their Hindu na" onalist connota" ons. Not only did they not share the 
Hindutva ideology, but they were also keen not to alienate their Muslim voters. At that " me, Advani 
started to evoke the need for a new BJP that would be a party of governance, not based on any precise 
ideology:
…a large area of governance has li  le to do with ideology – any ideology – except 
the overriding principle of na" onal interests. Indeed, good governance in most spheres 
of na" onal life becomes possible only when it is de-ideologized and de-poli" cized. Thus, 
if any issue, in spite of its inherent validity, acquires a strongly ideological character – 
in fact, so strong an ideological character as to make coali" on governance, and hence 
stable governance, diﬃ  cult – it is only proper to leave it out. This is precisely what we 
have done in the Na" onal Agenda. (Advani 1998:7)
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In 1999, the BJP even gave up the very idea of having its own separate elec" on manifesto. And the 
elec" on manifesto of the Na" onal Democra" c Alliance (NDA) promised “a moratorium on conten" ous 
issues” (NDA 1999:1), a phrase which obviously referred to the construc" on of the Ram temple in 
Ayodhya, the aboli" on of Ar" cle 370 of the Cons" tu" on and the imposi" on of a uniform civil code. The 
NDA also commi  ed itself to “genuine [as opposed to ‘posi" ve’] secularism.”
Certainl y, the compulsions of coali" on poli" cs prevented the BJP from organizing agita" ons and 
forced the party to moderate its discourse. But its leaders tacitly approved the an" -Muslim pogrom 
which took place in the BJP-governed state of Gujarat in 2002. The violence, in which 2,000 people 
died, was of a magnitude India had not experimented since Par" " on. Not only does the course of 
these opera" ons show carefully planned organiza" on, but it also indicates at least indirect oﬃ  cial 
state support. It would have been impossible to transport that many men (and gas cylinders) with 
that many trucks without the beneﬁ t of state logis" c support or at least the state’s neutrality. Above 
all, the protected nature of the clashes over days, weeks, and even months can only be explained 
by the government’s a$  tude. The administra" on was paralyzed. The standard response policemen 
gave to Muslims who called them to their rescue was: “We have no order to save you” (Human Rights 
Watch 2003). No member of the NDA, including, non-BJP coali" on leaders, did anything to support the 
Muslim vic" ms who relied only on the support of local NGOs. More importantly, no partner of the BJP, 
including former socialists like Defense Minister George Fernandes, cri" cized the way Gujarat’s Chief 
Minister Narendra Modi (BJP) dealt with the situa" on. The BJP was not forced to behave in a moderate 
manner in the states it governed alone.
Elec" ons were not scheduled un" l 2003, but Modi – a staunch RSS member – tried to capitalize 
on the highly communalized atmosphere his government had helped to create. In order to provoke 
by-elec" ons, he resigned from his post as Chief Minister and recommended that the governor should 
dissolve the Gujarat assembly, which the la  er – an RSS leader – did on 19 July. The Chief Elec" on 
Commissioner, who visited more than half of the state’s districts between 31 July and 4 August, was 
reluctant to organize any poll, especially since thousands of voters, a vast majority of them Muslims, 
were s" ll living far from their homes in refugee camps (Jaﬀ relot 2006b). Then the Modi government 
argued that in accordance with ar" cle 174 of the Cons" tu" on, the " me between dissolving the assembly 
and holding new elec" ons could not exceed six months. Na" onal BJP leaders, including Home Minister 
L. K. Advani, joined in the call for early elec" ons. Given the objec" ons of the Elec" on Commission, the 
BJP brought the case before the Supreme Court. The Court refused to express an opinion, referring to 
the decision of the Elec" on Commission. In early November, the Commission set a date for the Gujarat 
elec" ons to begin on December 12. The outcome was in Modi’s favor: the BJP garnered a majority of 
seats for the third " me in a row with a record score of 126 seats out of 182. Only the pogroms made 
this landslide possible: the BJP won all the seats in the three districts most heavily aﬀ ected by this 
extreme form of violence which polarized the voters along religious lines.
The RSS reconciled itself with the modera" on of the BJP’s discourse at the na" onal level insofar as 
it allowed the party to run the government. Such a posi" on of power enabled the RSS to have many 
of its ar" cles of faith implemented. Few weeks a& er taking over, the Vajpayee government organized 
the ﬁ rst nuclear test since 1974; RSS members and/or sympathizers were appointed at the helm of 
many ins" tu" ons including the Indian Council for Social Science Research and the Indian Council for 
Historical Research; the rewri" ng of the history textbooks was ini" ated by the Minister of Human 
Resources Development, M. M. Joshi, a staunch RSS man; the BJP government of Gujarat was not 
held accountable for the 2002 an" -Muslim pogrom. As long as the RSS found compensa" ons to the 
modera" on of the BJP, this strategy could con" nue: coali" on poli" cs at the center, extremism in the 
states the BJP ruled alone.
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II.4. The BJP in Opposi" on, Searching for a Strategy
On the basis of the BJP’s changing discourse in the late 1990s, scholars like Baldev Raj Nayar 
considered that the party was following a “centrist tendency.” According to him, there was “a uni-linear 
direc" on in change in party strategy towards modera" on and coali" on building” (Nayar 1999). In fact 
the modera" on of the BJP’s discourse was due to the compulsions of coali" on building. 
A& er returning to opposi" on in 2004, the BJP tried to con" nue with the NDA and resist the inﬂ uence 
of the RSS. The la  er a  ributed the party’s 2004 electoral defeat to the dilu" on of its ideology regarding 
mainstays of the Hindutva movement (like the Ram temple and the rejec" on of economic liberaliza" on 
which could only result in cultural globaliza" on). BJP president Advani was openly cri" cized by RSS 
supreme leader K. Sudarshan. In an unprecedented move, the la  er said, during a TV interview, that 
Advani and former Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee should make room for new faces. Advani, during the 
party’s Na" onal Execu" ve mee" ng on 18 September 2005, declared:
…an impression has gained ground that no poli" cal or organiza" onal decision can be 
taken without the consent of the RSS func" onaries. This percep" on will do no good 
either to the Party or to the RSS. […] the BJP as a poli" cal party is accountable to the 
people, its performance being periodically put to test in elec" ons. So in a democra" c, 
mul" -party polity, an ideologically driven party like the BJP has to func" on in a manner 
that enables it to keep its basic ideological stances intact and at the same " me expand 
itself to reach the large sec" ons of the people outside the layers of all ideology. 
This overall plea for the recogni" on of the party’s autonomy was not appreciated by new RSS leader 
Sudarshan. At the end of 2005, Advani was removed from the BJP’s presidency and Rajnath Singh 
took over from him. A& er the defeat of the BJP in the 2009 general elec" ons, when Advani had been 
projected by the party as its candidate for prime ministership, he was removed from the post of leader 
of the opposi" on in the lower house of Indian parliament and the RSS imposed a rather unknown 
ﬁ gure at the helm of the party, Ni" n Gadkari, a regional leader based in Maharashtra. 
As during the 1979 “dual membership” controversy, coali" on partners of the Hindu na" onalists 
reacted nega" vely to this poli" cal role of the RSS. Some non-NDA allies of the BJP, like the Telugu 
Desham Party whose leader worried about his Muslim voters, severed its links with the BJP. Others 
warned the BJP that they may leave the alliance if it bowed to the RSS. Right a& er the general elec" on, 
the Na" onal Execu" ve Commi  ee of the JD(U), one of the BJP’s coali" on partners in the NDA, issued a 
resolu" on to this eﬀ ect. It declared that:
We joined the Na" onal Democra" c Alliance only a& er the three controversial issues (construc" on 
of a Ram temple at Ayodhya, Ar" cle 370 and Uniform Civil Code) had been removed from the 
agenda of the NDA. If any eﬀ ort is now made to revive them, we shall have to take another road. 
(The Hindu, 2 August 2004)
The NDA, which comprised 18 par" es in the late 1990s, has shrunk by more than half a decade 
later. The non-RSS leaders that the BJP had a  racted (such as Jaswant Singh, former Foreign Aﬀ airs 
Minister and Yashwant Sinha, former Finance Minister) have been marginalized and/or have le&  in 
reac" on to the RSS’ a$  tude. As a result, some BJP leaders consider that the party no longer needs to 
betray its ideology if this does not bear fruits electorally. In fact, RSS leaders may persuade the party to 
return to its doctrinal roots in order to remobilize its cadres and its core supporters.
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The case of the Hindu na" onalist par" es in India suggests signiﬁ cant amendments to the modera" on 
theory. The thesis assumes that radical par" es are likely to dilute their ideology if they become part 
of a democra" c party system and that this process is more or less linear. In India, the inclusiveness of 
the poli" cal system has not been responsible for the modera" on of the Hindu na" onalist par" es over 
the last 60 years. In fact, there is no linear trend in the career of these par" es.11 They have constantly 
oscillated between a radical ethno-religious strategy and phases of tac" cal modera" on which did not 
alter their core ideology. These oscilla" ons may be explained by the interplay of three variables other 
than the ones proposed by the model. 
While the modera" on thesis postulates that taking part in electoral compe" " on leads poli" cal 
par" es to adopt a less exclusivist agenda, this variable has played a very ambivalent role in India: 
on the one hand the Jana Sangh has given up its Hindi-only approach of oﬃ  cial languages to a  ract 
more voters, but on the other hand, the Jana Sangh and the BJP have tried to build Hindu vote banks 
by polarizing the electorate through communal violence. Electoral compe" " on has fostered ethno-
religious conﬂ icts in India. The modera" on thesis assumes otherwise, because it has been primarily 
developed in rela" on to radical le& ist par" es which did not indulge in iden" ty poli" cs, and in rela" on to 
Catholic par" es of European socie" es. In these socie" es, the modera" on of these par" es has resulted 
as much from the accommoda" on strategies of party leaders as from a deep seculariza" on process. 
In India, religion remains a key iden" ty marker that may be used in poli" cs, especially in rela" on to 
majority communi" es like the Hindus at a na" onal level, to the Sikhs in Punjab (the only state in India 
where they are in a majority), or the Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir. In fact, the modera" on thesis is 
more heuris" c in India in the case of poli" cal par" es that represent minori" es, like the Jama’at-e-Islami 
which has renounced some of its fundamentalist ar" cles of faith, such as the rejec" on of democracy, 
in the course of its interac" on with democra" c prac" ces (Ahmad 2010). Thus, the assump" ons of the 
modera" on thesis regarding the impact of electoral compe" " on on radical religious par" es need to 
be qualiﬁ ed: democra" c elec" ons may make religious par" es even more radical, especially in non-
secularized socie" es and in the case of majority communi" es
The assump" on of the modera" on thesis regarding the role of coali" ons needs to be reﬁ ned 
too. The inclusion of a radical religious party like the Jana Sangh in 1967 or the BJP in 1989 in ruling 
coali" ons at the state level or at the na" onal level did not result in its modera" on. Coali" ons played a 
modera" ng role only when the partners of the Hindu na" onalists made their associa" on to the new 
grouping condi" onal to a dilu" on of its ideology, and when the coali" on was led by the BJP. Even then, 
the modera" on eﬀ ect needs to be qualiﬁ ed since neither the BJP leaders nor their coali" on partners 
reacted to the Gujarat pogroms.
Democra" c elec" ons and coali" on poli" cs are not panaceas in themselves. Their contribu" ons 
to the modera" on of radical religious par" es depend upon several condi" ons. In the case of Hindu 
11. The varia" ons of the Hindu na" onalists’ strategies are not only observed in terms of " me, but also in terms of space. This 
paper deals with the na" onal leadership only. But state leaders have used their room of manoeuvre for shaping their own 
oscilla" ons between moderate and radical strategies. Interes" ngly, the key variables men" oned about the Jana Sangh and 
the BJP at a na" onal level remain relevant at the state level. The role of elec" ons and coali" on making are cases in point. 
In Gujarat, the BJP of Modi polarized society through the 2002 pogrom and made sure that it drew its electoral beneﬁ ts by 
holding elec" ons a few months later. This extremist strategy was made easier by the fact that the BJP did not depend upon 
coali" on partners and did not face strong secularist par" es. In Bihar, by contrast, the BJP is associated with the JD(U) in the 
framework of a ruling coali" on. The JD(U) – which is very cri" cal of Modi’s policies – cul" vates a Muslim electorate, and the 
local BJP has become so moderate that it has approved posi" ve discrimina" on measures in favour of the Muslims.
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na" onalism, three addi" onal variables have accounted for the changing strategy of the Jana Sangh and 
the BJP: the a$  tude of its mother organiza" on (the RSS), the self-percep" on of the Hindu community, 
and the line of conduct of the other par" es, including those in government. 
Table 3. Variables Accoun" ng for the Strategies of the Hindu Na" onalist Par" 
Par" es Jana Sangh BJP
Phases Extremism
1951-1967
Modera" on
1967-1977
Modera" on
1980-1989
Extremism
1989-1998
Modera" on
1998-2004
Ak  tude of the 
RSS
Uncompromising
Accommoda" ng Uncompromising Uncompromising Accommoda" ng
Hindu 
sen" ments
No sense of 
vulnerability
No sense of 
vulnerability
Rising sen" ment 
of vulnerability
Sen" ment of 
vulnerability and 
desire of self-
asser" on
No sense of 
vulnerability
Impact of the 
coali" ons on 
the par" es’ 
strategies
No signiﬁ cant 
impact
No signiﬁ cant 
impact
No signiﬁ cant 
impact
No signiﬁ cant 
impact
Selec" vely 
modera" ng 
impact of the 
BJP-led NDA
The key role of the RSS shows that, contrary to the general assump" on of the modera" on thesis, 
poli" cal par" es some" mes do not emancipate themselves from their mother organiza" on, even in a 
democra" c environment and even when the la  er are sectarian to the core. In the case of the Jana 
Sangh and the BJP, these par" es depended upon the RSS not only because their leaders had been 
trained in this organiza" on, but also because the local cadres remained close to their alma mater.
The self-percep" on of the Hindus in rela" on to the other communi" es is the most elusive variable. 
It has played a determining role in the history of Hindu na" onalism; the radical mobiliza" on campaigns 
of the Jana Sangh and the BJP were only successful when Hindus, collec" vely, perceived themselves as 
vulnerable to the threat posed by other communi" es (including the Muslims) or the secular state. The 
1989-1992 Ayodhya aﬀ air is a case in point.
Last but not least, the Hindu na" onalist par" es were forced to moderate when the ruling party 
made a point that the cons" tu" onal principles of the Indian Republic be observed. Nehru and Indira 
Gandhi (at least during the 1960-1970s) did not give the Jana Sangh any quarter for ar" cula" ng 
communal discourses and strategies. Their successors, including Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao were 
more accommoda" ng and, therefore, undermined the rule of law. For the Indian state – including the 
judiciary – “locking in” modera" on gains would require to implement the principles of the Cons" tu" on 
in an uncompromising way.
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Table 4. The Modera" on Thesis and the Hindu Na" onalist Par" es
Impact on Radical Religious 
Par" es of…
… Democracy
…Electoral
Compe" " on …Coali" on Making
Modera" on Thesis
Acceptance of diversity 
and emancipa" on from 
extremist movements.
Dilu" on of the ini" al 
ideology in order to a  ract 
new voters.
Partnering with non-
radical par" es results in 
modera" on of sectarian 
par" es.
Trajectories of Hindu 
na" onalist par" es in India
Persis" ng xenophobia and 
allegiance to RSS.
Dilu" on of the Hindi-
only doctrine but 
instrumentaliza" on of 
Hindu sen" ments against 
religious minori" es.
Partnering with non-radical 
par" es did not result in 
modera" on, except to 
some extent when the BJP 
needed the support of 
allies to rule India.
Indeed, the conclusion one may draw from the Indian case is not that democracy is not able to 
make radical par" es more moderate, but that democracy cannot be reduced to elec" ons. Democracy 
relies also on the rule of law. If this basic principle is not observed, electoral compe" " on may result in 
“majoritarianism” (Kaviraj 1996), with the religious majority becoming a permanently dominant poli" cal 
majority. Such an ethniciza" on of democracy would inevitably weaken the rights of the minori" es (be 
they religious or linguis" c), whereas these rights are supposed to be protected in a democra" c regime. 
So far, the Indian poli" cal system has not shown the capacity to “lock in” the BJP’s modera" on process 
at the center, mostly because its government lacked the poli" cal will to enforce the principles of the 
Indian Cons" tu" on. 
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